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There are many reasons why Clarida’s “reflections” can be highly rec-
ommended to both academic and policy‐minded readers, and in this
note I briefly comment on some of them.
The best way to approach this paper is perhaps to start from its final
section on the real‐time forward‐looking Taylor rule. The first chart in
thissection(fig.1)plotsthetimeseriesoftheFedfundstargetrateagainst
a standard Taylor rule applied to U.S. data in the twenty‐first century.
What transpires from the visual inspection of the two series is that the
basic Taylor rule does not seem to provide a good description of the
Greenspan/Bernanke years. Clearly, on the last two occasions the U.S.
monetary stance was eased, this happened at a substantially faster pace
thanrequiredbytheTaylorrule,andthetighteningsince2004startedata
much later time than called for by the Taylor rule. Of course, the graph
has little to say on whether or not U.S. policy making has been “behind
the curve” in recent years, since the basic Taylor rule makes no claim
whatsoever to provide a normative benchmark for optimal monetary
policy. The only message of figure 1 is that the Taylor rule yields an in-
effective description of recent U.S. monetary policy.
For a relatively new and more informative way to look at policy rules,
thepapersuggestsrelyingondatafromtheinflation‐indexedbondsmar-
kets. In fact, at the very core of the paper is the suggestion that the
empirical fit of the U.S. funds rate can be dramatically improved by ad-
justing the Taylor rule with a forward‐looking measure of the inflation
gap based on Treasury Inflation‐Protected Securities (TIPS) break‐even
rates, with a time‐varying measure of the natural real interest rate based
on real yieldsin the inflation‐indexed bondsmarkets, as well aswith a mea-
sure of prospective output gap based on expected unemployment data.
This is a successful strategy. TIPS data provide high‐frequency infor-
mation on market conditions and expectations, and this is why they are
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even rates do not provide an ideal indicator of anticipated price dynam-
ics for a series of reasons, mostly related to the difficulty of disentangling
movements in risk premia from actual variations in inflation expecta-
tions. The approach consideredin the paperis simplyto assumethat risk
premia are constant over time. This strategy has obvious analytical ad-
vantages but is perhaps too simplistic. At any rate, visual comparison of
figures1and3revealsthatitispossibletoobtainadramaticimprovement
inthepositivedescriptionofthe Fedfundsratebehavior(andsimilarcon-
siderations are valid to some extent in the European case as well).
Why do we do so much better?
Clarida’s answer is that time‐varying real rates are driven by global
factors. In his own words:




the global influence on U.S. neutral real interest rates. Greenspan dur-
ing his tenure alluded to the “conundrum,” a situation in which the
Fed’s influence over long‐term interest rates is much diminished com-
pared to previous periods, a phenomenon that has been attributed to
the globalization of the financial markets in a world of (explicit or im-
plicit) inflation targeting.
This is insightful and, I believe, definitely on the right track. However,
not everybody agrees. For instance, there may be factors different from
global interdependencies and spillovers that affect the neutral rate (such
as movements in risk and term premiums, or domestic cycles and bub-
bles in the housing and other financial markets). So we need more than a
simple graphical analysis. We need an interpretive framework to eluci-
date the links between openness and macroeconomic fundamentals. We
need a choice‐theoretic normative approachto the design of optimal pol-
icy in an open‐economy context. And we need statistical evidence to dis-
criminate among alternative stories.
As a first pass in these directions, Clarida’s paper provides a model
of optimal monetary policy in an open economy. Does the model suc-
ceed insheddinglightonhowglobalspilloversaffectthedesignandcon-
duct of domestic monetary policy? The answer is mixed. The paper
shows convincingly that the appropriate monetary stance for an open
economy requires responding to changes in the time‐varying real
(natural) rate and forward‐looking inflation gap, consistent with the
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attempts to characterize the international mechanism of shock trans-
mission and its implications for monetary rules.
The theoretical framework is a variant of the highly regarded Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2002) model, in which optimal monetary policy is de-
scribed by a Taylor‐style rule such as
rt ¼ rrt þ θEtπtþ1; ð1Þ
where rrt is the domestic natural real interest rate, rt is the nominal short‐
term rate, Etπtþ1 is expected domestic inflation, and θ is a parameter
greater than one. Different from the standard Taylor rule, the above for-
mulaprovides a stylized normative benchmark foroptimal policy. In fact,
it maximizes a quadratic approximation to the social welfare function
expressedintermsofinflationandoutputgap.Incidentally,onemaywon-
der whether this traditional optimal‐control approach (based on a linear
quadraticcertaintyequivalenceframework)providestheappropriateway
to rationalize and explain the Greenspan/Bernanke years or whether an
alternative robust‐control analytical apparatus (with emphasis on risk
management and “insurance” against tail risks and worst‐case scenar-
ios) should be considered instead. But this is material for future ISOM
papers.
Thesimilaritybetweenthetheoreticaloptimalrule(1)andtheadjusted
Taylor rule of figure 3 in Clarida's paper is striking. One would expect
that there is much more to be learned from this formula. For instance,
the model suggests specific values for the coefficient of the inflation




ing to (1). Also, the model suggests a specific value for the coefficient of
the output gap (i.e., zero!). In figure 3, instead, the weight on the output
gap is one. Again, one is left curious on whether or not it would still be
possible to explain the time‐series behavior of the Fed funds rate with a
lower output gap weight, much closer to the theoretical prescription.
Next, look at rrt. The model provides a well‐defined link between nat-
ural rate and domestic and global output levels. But this information is
not exploited further in the paper.In particular,it would beinteresting to
test whether the relationship between TIPS real rates and measures of
global output areconsistent with the theoretical framework. Bythe same
token, the model provides a well‐defined notion of potential output as a
function ofworld GDP,to beusedin the definition ofoutput gap. Butthe
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sure of potential output based on a transformation of the domestic un-
employment rate, without incorporating global spillovers.
The paper strongly hints that one should not attempt to follow the
theoretical prescription too closely, since what matters is the spirit
of the model, and not quite its letter. In fact, according to the author,
“the main points presented in this paper are robust to the illustrative
model reviewed here, and in particular that such key inputs to mone-
tary policy as the neutral real interest rate and potential output cannot
be defined, modeled, or proxied without reference to an explicit global
framework.” I tend to agree, although this claim needs to be taken with
some caution. It is true that global variables are bound to have a signifi-
cantimpactonthe“keyinputstomonetarypolicy.”Butitisalsotruethat
the theoretical results are less robust than suggested, since relatively
minor variants of the model can lead to very different predictions for
the sign and the size of the macroeconomic spillovers.
To make my point in the simplest possible way, consider one of the
key propositions in the paper regarding the relation between foreign
output and the natural rate of domestic output in the open economy.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is realistically low
(or σ > 1 in the notation of the paper), a rise in foreign output uncor-
related with domestic productivity lowers home natural output.
With reference to the algebra of the paper, recall how we get to this
result. First, consumption depends on global output:
C ∝Y1 γY γ; 0 < γ < 1: ð2Þ










Fourth, the real wage (i.e., the relative price of leisure in terms of con-
sumption) is a markup over the marginal rate of substitution (the ratio
of marginal disutility of labor to marginal utility of consumption):
W
P
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V ¼
C1 σ









Putting together the pieces, we get
MC ∝ Yσð1 γÞþγþϕY σγ γ: ð8Þ
Finally,therealmarginalcostintheflexible‐priceequilibriumisaconstant:
MC ¼ const: ð9Þ
Fromtheprevioustwoequations,homenaturaloutputY (i.e.,theflexible‐
priceequilibriumlevelofpotentialoutput)isanegativefunctionofforeign
output Y  as long as σ > 1.
In a nutshell: Home output and marginal costs are positively related.
Foreignoutput expansions lower marginal costs (improving hometerms
of trade) by −γ. But foreign output expansions also increase marginal
costs (by increasing consumption, which reduces the marginal utility
of consumption, which raises real wages) by σγ.I fσ > 1, the second ef-
fect prevails. In the flex‐price equilibrium with unchanged real marginal
costs, foreign growth lowers home potential output, raising the neutral
domestic real interest rate.
Now, consider a small modification of the model and assume that
preferences are not additively separable but rather follow the specifica-
tion suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) (which,
incidentally, has desirable properties for modeling open economies as it
helps generating relatively high volatility in consumption and counter-
cyclical trade balances, consistent with empirical stylized facts):
V ¼
1






On the basis of this specification, the equations for the real wage and





MC ∝ YγþϕY  γ: ð12Þ
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pansions always lower domestic marginal costs through the terms of
trade effect. So, in the flex‐price equilibrium, foreign growth always in-
creaseshomenaturaloutput,exactlytheoppositeresultofwhatwaspre-
dicted by the model of the paper. This sensitivity analysis warns against
the supposed robustness and generality of the paper’s conclusions. The
simplest modification in the parameterization of utility turns out to
change the predicted sign of the relation between key macro variables,
even though all relevant elasticities remain the same!
This is not the only reason why one can be a bit skeptical about the
consistency of the model of Sections II–V with the analysis of Section VI.
Quoting once again from the text (my italics), “according to this analysis,
variations in the neutral real interest rate, perhaps due to the global saving glut
and enhanced financial integration in a world of inflation targeting central
banks, have played an important role in Fed policy this decade.”
The problem here is that the model assumes Cobb‐Douglas consump-
tion indexes, that is, a unit elasticity of intratemporal substitution be-
tween home and foreign goods. This is not an innocuous assumption.
Let us be clear about this point: Cobb‐Douglas indexes are a wonderful
modeling tool when one wants to focus on the effects of relative price
changes.Actually,relativepricesplaysuchakeyrolewithCobb‐Douglas
consumption baskets that they make redundant any other mechanism of
adjustment in the asset market. In fact, as Cole and Obstfeld (1991) have
emphasized, ina Cobb‐Douglas global economy, movementsof the terms
of trade are sufficient to generate full risk sharing worldwide even in a
regime of financial autarky, that is, even though no asset is internation-
ally traded. So, in the world economy described by the model, there is
absolutely no difference between balanced trade and complete financial
markets. Financial globalization is, quite simply, totally irrelevant. Per-
haps this is not the most useful theoretical framework to shed light on
the effects of financial integration on resource allocation and monetary
policy.
To make the same point in a slightly different way: in the model of
Clarida’s paper the current account is always balanced. This implies
that national saving equals national investment under Cobb‐Douglas
indexes. But there is no capital accumulation in the model. Therefore, in-
vestment is always zero. Therefore, saving is zero as well. Perhaps this is
notthemostappropriatetheoreticalframeworktoanalyzetheeffectsofa
global saving glut.
In conclusion, there seems to be a bit of “decoupling” between what
the model actually says and what the empirical analysis suggests. The
Comment 147challenge for future research that will build on the insights of this paper
is to bridge the gap between these two parts. What remains undisputedly
true is that, as Clarida succinctly puts it, “policy makers ignore open‐
economy influences at their peril.” And no one interested in the current
complexities of monetary policy can afford to overlook this message.
Endnote
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve System, or any
other institution with which the author is affiliated.
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